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I.

Introduction
The New York State Commission on Government Integrity

("Commission") today issues the third in a series of reports on
campaign financing practices in New York State.

This report

focuses on the crisis in New York City's campaign financing
system and the City's first steps toward reforming that system.

The Commission finds that those reforms, significant
though they are, fall short of what is needed to remove the
shadow cast by large private campaign contributions over the
integrity of municipal government:

a total ban on corporate

contributions as well as on contributions from those doing
business with the City; a prohibition on loans and loan guarantees (other than in the ordinary course of the lender's business)
in excess of the new City contribution limit; a limit on nonelection year fundraising; and the prompt modernization of the
Board of Estimate's obsolete recordkeeping practices so that the
public can readily monitor the extent to which contributors
benefit from favorable action by elected officials on the Board.

Full reform of New York City's campaign finance system
will require state legislation.

The Commission therefore renews

its call for the prompt passage by the state legislature of a
campaign finance reform measure that will, at long last, rank New
York among those states which have determined that the campaigns

of public officials are too serious a matter to place in the
hands of the moneyed few.

II.

overview of Commission Recommendations and Recent Law
Reform Efforts

A. Guideposts For Reform

on December 21, 1987, the Commission issued its first
report on campaign financing.l

Calling for sweeping reform of

New York's campaign finance laws, the Commission unanimously
concluded that "New,York's campaign financing laws and procedures
are so inadequate and outmoded that they undermine public
confidence in the honesty and integrity of government and will
remain a public embarrassment unless and until they are reformed. 112

The Commission's December report urged the state
legislature to enact a new campaign financing law and summarized
four key elements of reform:3
1 Campaign Financing: Preliminarv Reoort
(December 21,
1987) (hereinafter "the December report"). This report was
issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 88.1, paragraph II.5
(April 21, 1987), which directs the Commission to investigate the
adequacy of New York's "laws, regulations and procedures relating
to campaign contributions and campaign expenditures." Copies of
this and subsequent campaign finance reports issued by the
Commission are available from the Commission upon request.
2 Id. at 1-2.

3 Id. at 7-8.
-

2 -

1.
Drastically reduced campaign contribution limits and prohibitions on direct
contributions from corporations, labor
unions, and those doing business with
government.
·
2.
Full, detailed and timely disclosure of
all campaign contributions and expenditures.
3.
Optional public funding of elections for
statewide offices, coupled with carefully
prescribed expenditure limits for those
campaigns, and removal of state law barriers
to public funding for local elections.
4.
Creation of a new, adequately funded
Campaign Financing Enforcement Agency with
extensive powers to implement and enforce
campaign financing laws and regulations.

In a second report, The Albany Money Machine: Campaign
Financing For New York State Legislative Races 4 , the Commission
highlighted the disproportionate role played by corporate,
business and union contributors in funding state political party
committees and legislative elections and renewed its call for the
enactment of strengthened campaign disclosure laws, drastically
reduced contribution limits and the establishment of a strong,
independent enforcement agency.

Unfortunately, that call remains unheeded.

While a

significant reform bill passed the State Assembly on February 22,
1988, there has been no parallel action in the State Senate.

At

4 Copies of this August 1988 report are available from the
Commission.
-
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the state level, therefore, it is business as usual:

individuals

may still contribute up to $40,000 for statewide general
elections and up to $150,000 per year for all political purposes5; corporate executives, law firm partners and other
business associates may still conceal their business affiliation
by providing only their home address on the state-mandated
campaign contribution disclosure form; and candidates may still
solicit and spend unlimited amounts of money -- much of it raised
from individuals and businesses seeking various government
benefits --to seek elected office.

B. New York City's New Campaign Finance Act

In contrast, the New York City Council took an
important step toward campaign financing reform with the
enactment of the New York City Campaign Finance Act (hereinafter
"the Campaign Finance Act" or "the Act").6

This law, which

allows candidates to choose to accept partial public funding of
their campaigns, incorporates several aspects of campaign
financing reform advocated by the Commission in its December
report.

The amount which individuals may contribute during one

election cycle to candidates for citywide office who choose the

5 N.Y. Elec. Law §14-114(8)

(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988).

6 Local Law 8 of 1988 (to be codified at New York Cityi N.Y.
Admin. Code §§3-701 to 714) was signed into law by Mayor Koch on
February 29, 1988.
- 4 -

public funding option is lowered from $100,000 to $6,ooo.7
Contributors to those who elect public funding must, for the
first time, disclose not only their home address but also their
occupation, employer, bus.i ness address and the name, occupation,
employer and business address of any intermediary who solicited
their contribution.a

As public hearings held by the Commission on March 14
and 15 and June 20, 1988 revealed,9 the abuses at which the
Campaign Finance Act's contribution limits are aimed are real and
widespread.

Many individual contributors, including those who

have had business pending before the Board of Estimate, have
contributed tens of thousands of dollars to the citywide candidates. lo Their contributions, in the future, will be limited to
7 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §3-703(1) (f).
Specifically, the
contribution limit for the three citywide officials is $3,000 for
the primary and $3,000 for the general election. For borough
presidents, the new limit is $2,500 per election: for City
Council members, the figure is $2,000 per election.
8 Id. §3-703 (6).

9 The Commission hearings are cited below as "March 14
Tr.", "March 15 Tr." and "June Tr.", respectively. Transcripts
of those hearings are available for copying from the Commission.
lO Thirty-seven individuals who each contributed $10,000
or more during the period from January 1, 1983 through January 1,
1986 accounted for 31% of the contributions received by Andrew J.
Stein in his 1985 race for City Council President: twenty-eight
individuals who each contributed $10,000 or more accounted for
25% of the contributions received by Comptroller Harrison J.
Goldin during that period: fifty-two individuals who each
contributed $10,000 or more accounted for 18% of the contributions received by Edward I. Koch. A further breakdown of
contributions to the three citywide officeholders is included in
Appendix A.
-
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$6,000 to candidates who accept public funding.11

The New York City Campaign Finance Act also provides a
much needed tightening of disclosure requirements.

The Commis-

sion staff has identified numerous clusters of contributions
which, because they were each made on the same day and for
similar amounts of money, appear to have been "bundled", i.e.,
solicited by one or more key intermediaries.

Because state law

does not require contributors to disclose either their employer
or their business address, it has frequently been impossible to
determine from the face of a campaign disclosure statement the
common thread to contributions and what special business
interests they represent.12

Thanks to the new disclosure

requirements contained in the New York City law, the public will
11 Information on candidates' contributions compiled by the
Commission from the New York City Board of Elections' records for
the period January 1, 1983 through January 1, 1986 shows that
over one-third (36%) of the money raised by Council President
Stein during that period came from individuals who contributed
$6000 or more to his campaign. Mayor Koch and Comptroller Goldin
raised, respectively, 20% and 28% of their contributions from
individuals who contributed $6000 or more.
12 Only by going beyond the face of the filings has the
Commission been able to lay bare the common element in many of
those cases. Thus, for instance, the Commission determined by
investigation that twenty-five contributions of $1,000 each
received by Comptroller Goldin's Committee for a Better
Government, Inc. on February 8, 1985 were made by executives of
Bear Stearns, June Tr. at 193-94 & Exh. 57; so too were nineteen
individual contributions totaling over $23,500 made on December
11, 1984 to New Yorkers for Koch 1 85. Twenty-one partners in the
law firm of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn jointly
contributed $8,600 to New Yorkers for Koch 1 89 on December 17,
1987; fifty Kidder Peabody executives contributed $22,800 to
Comptroller Goldin on July 19, 1985 and September 17, 1985 from
locations scattered across the United States.
-
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at last be able to discern from the filings themselves the
business affiliation and possible special interests of each
contributor.

Significant as the new contribution limits and
disclosure requirements contained in the Campaign Finance Act
are, they constitute only a partial reform.

First, the reduced contribution limits and disclosure
requirements apply only to candidates who accept public funding .13

Under the Act, candidates who reject public funding are

not bound by the new limits or disclosure rules, and are free to
accept individual contributions up to the maximum allowed by
state law -- for citywide office, $50,000 for the primary and
$50,000 for the general election -- without disclosing the
contributor's business affiliation.

Second, even for candidates who agree to abide by the
new rules, major loopholes undermine the effectiveness of those
rules.

Despite the new $3,000 contribution limit, corporations

can still make virtually unlimited contributions through gifts

13 The Commission recognizes the concern of the drafters of
the new law that the current legal authority of the City to set
contribution limits lower than those contained in state law,
except as a condition of accepting public funds, is subject to
question. Full reform requires state legislation. See
generally, R. Briffault, Report To The Charter Revision
Commission Concerning A Local Campaign Finance Charter Amendment
(June 11, 1987).
-
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from multiple subsidiaries and affiliates.

Candidates may accept

loans without regard to the new contribution limits, provided
they are repaid prior to the next election.

They may accept

multiple gifts under $3,000 from an unlimited number of corporate
executives or law firm partners, even if the contributor's
employer or firm does business with the City.

And candidates are

still free to hold fundraisers and accept contributions throughout the entire four-year election cycle, thus perpetuating the
vicious cycle of spiraling campaign costs and fundraising.

c.

outline of Commission Recommendations

This third Commission report examines in detail these
weaknesses in the new law, drawing upon the evidence from its
public hearings in March and June 198814 and the fruits of its
investigations and staff research.

Passage of state legislation

along the lines suggested in the Commission's December report
remains imperative.

In the interim, the Commission urges the

prompt passage of an amendment to the New York City Campaign
Finance Act which would ban corporate contributions and contributions from those doing business with the City; prohibit loans and
loan guarantees (other than in the ordinary course of the
lender's business) in excess of $3,000 per election; and prevent
candidates from accepting contributions more than 15 months

l4 A list of witnesses for the March and June hearings is
attached hereto as Appendix B.
-
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before the primary election.

Finally, the Commission calls upon

the City to pursue aggressively the modernization of the Board of
Estimate's recordkeeping practices so that the public can readily
monitor the extent to which contributors benefit from favorable
action by elected City officials on the Board.

III.

New York City's Campaign Finance Law Must Be Strengthened.

A.

Corporate Contributions Should Be Banned

Current state law limits a corporation's contributions
to all candidates combined to $5,000 per calendar year.15

As the

commission hearings revealed, this corporate contribution limit
is so easily evaded that it is a limit in name only.

Testimony

at the Commission's hearings in March revealed striking examples
of wealthy contributors who made contributions far in excess of
$5,000 by directing multiple contributions of $5,000 or less from
the many corporations they contro1.l6
15 N.Y. Election Law §14-116(2)
1988) .

(McKinney 1978 & Supp.

16 For example, real estate developer Gerald Guterman
contributed a total of $100,000 to Comptroller Goldin's campaign
committee between December 27, 1984 and January 4, 1985 through
21 corporations he controlled (March 14 Tr. at 229-35); Donald
Trump contributed $30,000 to Council President Stein through 17
corporations on August 29, 1985; three corporations controlled by
Robert Pressman and his family contributed $15,000 to Mayor
Koch's 1985 campaign on April 28, 1985.
The channeling of large contributions through multiple
corporations is by no means restricted to the real estate
(continued ... )
-
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Perhaps the most striking example of the ease with
which the spirit of the corporate contribution limit can be
'

circumvented is illustrated by testimony at the Commission's
March 14, 1988 hearing.

Responding to a solicitation at a

private luncheon to which he had been invited by Comptroller
Goldin, real estate developer Joseph Bernstein testified that he
made a $25,000 contribution in Febrµary 1984 to Goldin's
Committee for a Better Government through his corporation, the
New York Land Company.17

Nine months later, on or about November

15, 1984, the Committee for a Better Government refunded the
$25,000 to Mr. Bernstein.18

Within a matter of days, the New

York Land Company had repackaged the $25,000 contribution and
forwarded five checks from five different corporate affiliates
totaling $25,000 to the Committee for a Better Government.19
Merely lowering the corporate limit from $5,000 to
16 ( ••. continued)
industry. On December 28, 1984, Drexel Burnham Lambert forwarded
five checks to Comptroller Goldin's Committee for a Better
Government, each in the amount of $5,000, from five separate
Drexel affiliates (March 14 Tr. at 91 & Exh. 18); four affiliates of Prudential Bache, Inc. contributed $20,000 to Mayor
Koch on September 23, 1985; four affiliates of Shearson Lehman
Brothers contributed $19,000 to Comptroller Goldin on August 29,
1985 (March 14 Tr. 97-98 & Exh. 21) and $10,000 to Mayor Koch on
January 13, 1988. June Tr. at 21~22 & Exh. 27.
Overall, corporate contributions accounted for 29% of
the contributions raised by Mayor Koch, 28% of the contributions
raised by Council President Stein and 33% of the contributions
raised by Comptroller Goldin for the 1985 election.
17 March 14 Tr. at 132-34.
18 Id. at 138-39.
19 Id. at 139.

See also March 14 Tr. at 88-91.
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$3,000, as New York City's Campaign Finance Act does, will not
diminish the amount of money which corporate contributors can
pour into campaigns.

Mayor Koch, for instance, voluntarily

imposed a $3,000 limit on corporate contributions to his December
1987 annual fundraising dinner. Nonetheless, as testimony at our
June hearings revealed, corporate contributors in some cases gave
exactly as much after the $3,000 limit was imposed as they had
given when there was a $5,000 corporate limit:

they merely

increased the number of affiliates through which the contributions were made.20

The new City Campaign Finance Act, like the Mayor's
voluntary restrictions, limits corporate contributions to $3,000.
But, as the Mayor testified before the Commission in June:21
There's great debate as to whether or not the
existing language of the law would preclude
subsidiaries or affiliates
[I]t's the
belief of some of us that the law does not
preclude the subsidiaries but if it does not
directly, then we believe that [the Campaign
Finance Board], which has been created under
the law, would have the right to define the
subsidiaries as one person and, therefore,
20 Five separate subsidiaries of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
for instance, contributed $20,000 to the Mayor's campaign on a
single day in 1985.
In 1987, Merrill Lynch subsidiaries again
contributed $20,000 to the Mayor,
only this time the
contributions came from seven separate subsidiaries.
June Tr.
at 22; Exh. 25.
Real estate developer Bernard Mendik, who,
together with his wife, individually contributed $15,000 to the
Mayor in 1985, contributed $16,000 to the Mayor in 1987:
$2,000
each from Bernard Mendik and his wife individually and a total of
$12, 000 from four Mendik-aff iliated corporate entities.
June
· Tr. at 23; Exh. 29.
21 June Tr. at 18-19.
- 11 -

And if they
subject to the limitation.
don't have that legal right ... we would hope
they make that recommendation, and then the
Council would abide by it.
Despite the ambiguity in the Campaign Finance Act,
Mayor Koch made a commitment at the Commission's June hearing
that his campaign committee would not accept more than a total of
$3,000 from a corporation and its subsidiaries combined.22

Later

that week, Comptroller Goldin announced that he would not accept
any corporate contributions (or corporate PAC contributions) for
the 1989 municipal elections.23

While the Commission is encouraged by these selfimposed fundraising restraints, we are mindful that these
voluntary restraints are just that

voluntary.

Neither the

Campaign Finance Act nor the proposed charter amendment dealing
with public fundraising includes a ban on either corporate
contributions or on contributions from multiple corporate
affiliates and subsidiaries.

The federal government has long prohibited corporations
22 June Tr. at 20, 86. On March 16, 1988, two weeks after
the Campaign Finance Act went into effect, New Yorkers for Koch
1989 accepted $15,000 in contributions from six corporations
controlled by Robert Pressman and his family.
Twelve thousand
dollars of those contributions were refunded by the campaign
committee on July 6, 1988, following the Mayor's testimony at the
Commission's June hearing.
23 Letter from New York City Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin
to Commission Chairman John D. Feerick dated June 24, 1988, on
file with the Commission.
- 12 -

from making financial contributions to candidates for federal
office.24

A similar ban is in effect in more than a dozen

states.25

As the United States Supreme Court ruled in upholding

the federal ban on- corporate contributions, "substantial
aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization should not be converted
into political •war chests' which could be used to incur
political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions.1126
24 See 2 U.S.C. §441b(a) and (b) (2), which prohibit a
corporation from making "any direct or indirect payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit or gift of money or any
services •••• to any candidate, campaign committee, or political
party or organization, in connection with any election to any of
the off ices referred to in this section
"
25 Alabama - Ala. Code §10-2A-70.1 (1987); Arizona - Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-919 (Supp. 1987); Iowa - Iowa Code Ann.
§56.29 (West Supp. 1988); Kentucky - Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §121.025
(Supp. 1987); Massachusetts - Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 55, §8 (Law Coop. Supp. 1988); Michigan - Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §169.254 (West
Supp. 1988); Minnesota - Minn. Stat. Ann. §210A.34 (West Supp.
1988); Montana - Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-227 (1987); New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. §19:34-45 (West Supp. 1988); North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. §163-269 (1987); North Dakota - N.D.- Cent. Code
§16.1-08-02 (Supp. 1987); Ohio - Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3599.03
(Baldwin 1988); Oklahoma - Okla. Const. Art. 9, §40 (Supp. 1988);
Tennessee - Tenn. Code Ann. §2-19-132 (1987); Texas - Tex. Elec.
Code Ann. §251.010 (Vernon 1987); West Virginia - W. Va. Code
§3-8-8 (Supp. 1988); Wisconsin - Wisc. Stat. Ann. §11.38 (West
1987); Wyoming - Wyo. Stat. §22-25-102 (Supp. 1988). Of these
states, Alabama prohibits contributions only from public
utilities and Massachusetts and New Jersey prohibit contributions
from banks, trust companies, surety companies, insurance
companies and public utilities.
26 Federal Electiori Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982).
An additional reason for the prohibition of corporate
campaign contributions was recently advanced by the Kings County
(continued ... )
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The Commission reaffirms its recommendation that a
total ban be imposed on corporate contributions similar to the
ban on corporate contributions in effect both at the federal
level and in numerous other states.

B. Loans Should Be Limited To The Same Extent
As Contributions

In today's media intensive campaigns, candidates are
often confronted with the last minute need to cover very large
media bills.

For this and other purposes, loans provide a way to

raise large sums of money in a relatively short period of time.

Although loans may provide quick infusions of cash,
they may also have lingering adverse side effects.

Elected

officials often end up in the untenable position of owing vast
sums of money to persons or entities that do business with the
City.

This ethical dilemma is only compounded by a lack of

meaningful disclosure since the financial disclosure statements
promulgated by the State Board of Elections do not require the

26( ..• continued)
District Attorney, Elizabeth Holtzman. In a report on campaign
practices in Brooklyn elections, Ms. Holtzman pointed out that
"one of the major problems posed by [corporate] contributions is
that they can conceal the identity of the real contributor" since
"[c]orporations may be less reluctant than individuals to allow
themselves to be used to funnel another's contribution into a
campaign." E. Holtzman, Report on Campaign Practices in Brooklyn
Elections in Recent Years (August 17, 1988) at 9-10.

- 14 -

disclosure of clear or comprehensive information relating to loan
transactions.27

Andrew Stein's 1985 campaign for City Council President
is a case in point.
1

During the course of that campaign, Stein

85 (Mr. Stein's authorized political committee) borrowed

approximately $1.2 million.

Of this sum, approximately $300,000

was borrowed directly from twelve individuals or entities. 28

An

additional $900,000 was borrowed from commercial banks and
guaranteed by twenty-three Stein supporters.29

27 State disclosure forms are not designed to report
complicated loan transactions. With respect to loans taken, the
disclosure statement mandates that debt instruments be attached
and guarantors identified. With respect to loan repayments,
however, there is no such requirement. Rather, the forms merely
call for the date and amount of the loan repayment, along with
the name and address of the lender. Accordingly, where guarantors rather than the campaign committee repay the loans, the
forms provide little meaningful disclosure.
28 For instance, between January 31, 1986 and August 21,
1986, Stein '85 borrowed a total of $180,000 from three individuals and one law firm associated with Telecom Plus of New
York City, Inc. June Tr. at 114-15. According to City records,
Council President Stein voted on June 30, 1986 to approve a $1.29
million City contract between the City Department of General
Services and Telecom Plus for the purchase and installation of
telephones and switching equipment. See Calendar of the Board of
Estimate, June 30, 1986, no. 435. Stein testified at the
Commission's hearing in June that he "had absolutely no idea that
these people had anything in any way, shape or form, to do with
the Board of Estimate when I was getting help from them." June
Tr. at 114.
29 Stein 1 85 obtained guarantees for $200,000 from the same
three individuals and law firm associated with City vendor Telcom
Plus. See footnote 28 above. An . additional $300,000 of Stein
'85's loans were guaranteed by six major New York City real
estate developers.
- 15 -

Today, three years later, much of that debt remains
outstanding.

Although over $800,000 of the more than $900,000

borrowed from commercial banks has been repaid, more than half,
approximately $500,000, was repaid to the banks by the individual
guarantors, many of whom, like real estate developers Donald
Trump and William Zeckendorf, do business with New York City.30
Of the more than $300,000 borrowed directly from individuals,
only $50,000 has been repaid -- including a $15,000 repayment to
the candidate himself.

Thus, as of Stein '85's most recent

disclosure statement of July 15, 1988, the campaign still has
more than $334,000 in loans outstanding.

Once again, much of

this debt is owed to persons or entities that do business with
New York City.

New York City's Campaign Finance Act largely fails to
address these problems.

First, contributors may make loans

without regard to the Act's contribution limits.

Only to the

extent that such loans are not repaid prior to the next election
are they deemed contributions subject to the Act's applicable
limits. 3 1

Moreover, even if an excessive loan is not timely

repaid, it is unlikely that the candidate will be seriously
penalized.

Criminal penalties are available only if it can be

30 In some instances, although they originally expected only
to guarantee the loan, guarantors found themselves actually
repaying sums outstanding. See, ~, testimony of William
Zeckendorf, March 14 Tr. pp. 215-217; Gerald Guterman, id. at
pp. 238-39; Donald Trump, id. at pp. 254-55.
31 N . Y• C . Ad min.
'
d §3-702(8).
Coe
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proven that, at the time the loan was taken, the candidate had no
intention of repaying it.32

Otherwise, the only penalty imposed

by the Act is a civil fine not to exceed $10,000.33

Second, a provision of the campaign Finance Act
specifically added by the City Council -- there was no corresponding provision in the Mayor's proposed legislation -allows liabilities outstanding on the effective date of the new
law to be paid off with contributions subject only to the State's
appallingly high contribution limits.34

Such spending is also

deemed separate from the candidate's regulated expenditures.

These provisions present a serious loophole in the new
law and subvert the law's attempts to diminish the influence of
large contributors.

Although prevented from directly making

large contributions, individuals can still bankroll campaigns
through excessively large loans.

The Commission believes that these weaknesses in the
new City Campaign Finance Act can be addressed only by prohibiting all loans and loan guarantees

(except in the ordinary course

of the lender's business) in excess of contribution limits.
Loans must be recognized for what they are -- another form of
32 Id. §3-711(3).
33 Id. §3-711(1).
34 Id. §3-712.
- 17 -

contribution.

C.

The Need For Limits on Contributions From Those
Who Benefit From Discretionary City Decisions
1.

City Officials Are Heavily Dependent on
Contributions From Those Over Whom They
Exercise Discretion

The three citywide officials may vote to grant or
withhold an enormous range of financial benefits.

As members of

the Board of Estimate, they vote on zoning variances and tax
abatements for developers; they approve or disapprove lucrative
contracts for engineering, financial and legal services; they
vote to ratify or reject multi-million dollar leases for City
offices.

The Commission's hearings dramatically illustrated the
extent to which the three citywide officials seek out and are
dependent upon contributions from those industries whose members
may do business with the City.

Fully one-half of the campaign

funds raised by Andrew Stein in his 1985 race for the presidency
of the City Council were made by contributors from four industries whose members frequently come before the Board of
Estimate:

real estate, financial services, legal services and

construction and engineering.

Over forty percent of the

Comptroller's financial base in 1985 was comprised of contributions from firms and employees in just two industries:
estate and financial services.

real

These same two industries
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accounted for a quarter of the Mayor's fundraising receipts for
the 1985 election.35

Those who stand to benefit from favorable City
decisions are intimately involved in the fundraising process in
New York City.

The dinner committee list for the Mayor's

December 1987 fundraising event -- a list of those upon whom the
Mayor's fundraising organization depends for the sale of tickets
to the fundraising dinner 36 -- includes the names of many who do
business with the City on a large-scale basis.37

Prominent real

35 These percentages of interest group contributions are
minimums. While we have been able to identify certain contributors as members or representatives of various industries
and have included them in these percentages, we have not been
able to identify all individuals employed or affiliated with
those industries who may well have similar interests at stake,
and whose contributions may in fact have been solicited or even
orchestrated by their employers. The disclosure forms promulgated by the State Board of Elections do not require information
concerning a contributor's occupation or employer -- a failure
which we strongly believe must be rectified at the State level if
the public is to be adequately informed.
36 See March 14 Tr. at pp. 29-31 & Exh. 2.
37 For example, Bernard Mendik, whose name appears on the
Mayor's dinner committee list, leases a number of substantial
properties to the City; as recently as June 30, 1987 the Board of
Estimate approved a two-year lease at $4,962,654 per year
between the City and a Mendik affiliate. See Board of Estimate
resolution dated June 30, 1987, Calendar No. 117. Joseph Pinto,
also on the Mayor's 1987 dinner committee list, is a vice
president of Manuel Elken Co., P.C., a firm of consulting
engineers, whose engineering consulting contracts with the City
repeatedly come before the Board of Estimate for approval. Se~
Board of Estimate resolutions dated May 21, 1987 (Calendar No.
264); February 11, 1988 (Calendar No. 191); February 25, 1988
(Calendar No. · 261).
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estate developers, investment bankers, and lobbyists 38 whose
firms or clients have had or can reasonably expect to have
business dealings with the City, have lent their names and, in
many instances, their active support, to the Mayor's fundraising
efforts.

As a number of witnesses have testified, those who have
had or who could reasonably be expected to have business before
the Board have been vigorously courted by candidates.

Real

estate developer Joseph Bernstein testified that he received
personal telephone calls from Harrison Goldin, Andrew Stein and
Kenneth Lipper (then a candidate for City Council President)
seeking to enlist his financial support for the 1985 election.39
38 Numerous attorneys who appear on the Mayor's dinner
committee list--Howard Hornstein, Victor Marrero, Peter
Piscitelli, Peter Tufo, John Zuccotti, to name a few--are also
registered lobbyists who appear on behalf of clients before
various City agencies and officials. At the Commission's hearing
in June, Howard J. Rubenstein, a prominent public relations
figure and lobbyist who was a member of the Mayor's 1987 dinner
committee, announced that he would no longer raise campaign funds
for any public official before whom he might appear and that he
would support legislation barring lobbyists from raising funds
for any officials or legislators whom they lobbied. June Tr. at
pp. 280-82. As Mr. Rubenstein testified:
I came to the conclusion that this
appearance, not the substantive fact, but the
appearance of a lobbyist raising money,
substantial or otherwise, for people before
whom they appear was not appropriate ..• [I]t
was there, that appearance that perhaps the
lobbyist was gaining an undue advantage, or
a position that was perhaps not in the public
interest.
June Tr. at pp. 281-82.
39 March 14 Tr. at pp. 128-133.
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According to Mr. Bernstein, both Mr. Lipper and Mr. Goldin were

.

explicit in their fundraising demands: in a meeting in Mr.
Bernstein's office,

Mr. Lipper asked Mr. Bernstein for a

contribution of $10,00o. 4

°

Comptroller Goldin, who invited Mr.

Bernstein and his brother to lunch at the Plaza Hotel, told Mr.
Bernstein in the course of that lunch that "he thought that a
contribution of $50,000, $25,000 for each of two years, would be
appropriate. 11 41

Real estate developer William Zeckendorf, who in

1986 had several major development projects that required Board
approval, echoed the same theme: the contributions he has made to
Council President Stein were the result, for the most part, of
personal solicitations from the candidate.42

During the June hearings, the Commission explored with
Comptroller Goldin contributions aggregating $25,000 which he
received on February 8, 1985 from twenty-five executives of Bear,
Stearns & Co., Inc. 4 3

The Comptroller acknowledged that he had

discussed the collection and delivery of these contributions
with Alan Greenberg, Bear Stearns' chief executive officer.44
40 March 14 Tr. at pp. 129-30.
41 March 14 Tr. at p. 132.
42 March 14 Tr. at pp. 213-14, 218-19.
43 June Tr. at pp. 193-196. The filings themselves contain
only the contributor's name and home address. The fact that the
contributors in question were executives of Bear Stearns is not
apparent from the filings.
The identity of the contributors nad
to be independ€ntly determined by the Commission's staff.
44 June Tr. at 195-96.
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Bear Stearns has been, for a number of years, a member of the
team of investment banking firms selected to underwrite the
City's general obligation bonds.
Estimate voted to

~pprove

More recently, the Board of

a one-year $430,000 contract for Bear

Stearns to serve as an investment advisor to the New York City
Police Pension Fund.45

The Mayor and the Comptroller are both vested with
substantial independent discretion, separate and apart from the
discretion they exercise as members of the Board of Estimate.
For instance, without review by the Board of Estimate, they
jointly select the team of investment banking firms that
underwrite billions of dollars of New York City general obligation bonds.46

Sixteen firms were recently selected to serve as

the underwriting syndicate for the distribution of City bonds.
Fourteen of these firms and/or their employees contributed over
$260,000 to the Comptroller's 1985 re-election campaign in 1984
and 1985: twelve of these firms and/or their employees contributed over $150,000 to the Mayor's 1985 re-election cam-

45 Board of Estimate Calendar No. 148, April 30, 1987. The
following year, on April 28, 1988, the Board of Estimate voted
11-0 to approve a $125,000 contract for Bear Stearns to serve as
investment advisor to the New York City Fire Pension Fund.
46 Both the Mayor and the Comptroller testified that they
delegate the selection of underwriters to their staff. June Tr.
at 27, 198. However, both officials retain the power to confirm
-- or reject -- their staff recommendations. Id.
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paign. 47

Such large contributions to the two public officials

charged by law with the final authority for the selection of bond
underwriters raise troubling appearances of influence seeking.

2.

Existing Limits on Contributions To Board of
Estimate Members Are Inadequate.
In an effort to address the problem of the real or

apparent influence of large contributions from those with
business before the Board of Estimate, the New York state
election law was amended in July 1986.

The so-called Goodman

amendment does not altogether ban contributions by those doing
business with the City.

Rather, it prohibits those whose

business transactions with New York City require approval by the
Board of Estimate from making contributions or loans in excess of
$3,000 to a member of the Board six months before or twelve
months after the Board officially considers the transaction.48
The same prohibition applies to partners, corporate officers and
5% shareholders whose partnership or corporation has business
pending before the Board.
However well-intentioned, the Goodman amendment has
47 In contrast, Council President Stein, who has no role in
the selection of bond underwriters, received less than $40,000 in
contributions from four of the investment banking firms and/or
their employees for his City Council President race; $31,500 of
those contributions were made by employees of a single firm, Bear
Stearns & Co., Inc.
48 N.Y. Election Law §14-114(9) (a)
1988) .
-
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(McKinney 1978 & Supp.

several major loopholes.

The $3,000 limit contained in the

Goodman amendment is not an aggregate limit: no matter how
numerous they may be, partners, corporate officers and corporate
affiliates - of the entity with business pending before the Board
may each give up to $3,000 for an unlimited tota1.49

The Goodman Amendment's treatment of contributions
from partnerships--a common form of doing business among lawyers
and real estate developers--is also problematic.

For instance,

on October 20, 1986, the law firm of Shea & Gould made a $5,000
contribution to New Yorkers for Koch •as.SO

A question was

subsequently raised as to the propriety of that contribution
under the Goodman amendment, coming as it did four months before
the Board of Estimate's calendaring on February 26, 1987 of a
contract between Shea & Gould and the New York City Off-Track
Betting Corporation.

Shea & Gould sought and obtained an opinion from the New
49 Thus, for instance, the Board of Estimate approved a
$430,000 contract for Bear Stearns to serve as investment advisor
to the New York City Police Pension Fund on April 30, 1987. In
December 1987, less than twelve months after the Board of
Estimate vote, Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., its political action
committee, an affiliated company and an officer contributed an
aggregate of $8,000 to Mayor Koch. Three Citicorp-related
entities contributed $9,000 to Mayor Koch on December 24, 1987,
less than three weeks before the Board of Estimate voted to
approve a special permit application for a wholly owned
subsidiary of Citibank.
SO New Yorkers For Koch 1985, Inc. 's January lS, 1987
financial disclosure statement reveals that Shea & Gould had
previously contributed $2S,OOO to the committee.
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York State Board of Elections, 5 1 which left open the possibility
that as long as an individual partner's proportionate share of
the partnership contribution, together with his or her individual
contributions, does not exceed $3,000, there is no Goodman
amendment violation. 52

Nonetheless, New Yorkers for Koch '85

refunded $2,000 of Shea & Gould's $5,000 contribution on May 28,
1987. It does not appear, however that other partnership
contributions have been treated similarly.53

51 See New York State Board of Elections Formal Opinion #1,
(May 15, 1987).
52 This interpretation seems at odds with the plain language
of the Goodman amendment which prohibits any "person, corporation, joint stock association or partnership" from making a
contribution or loan in excess of $3,000 to Board of Estimate
candidates and which requires any "person, corporation, joint
stock association or partnership which has made a contribution or
loan in excess of $3,000" to report the contribution to the
Secretary of the Board. Election Law §14-114(9) (a) and (c).
53 According to its July 15, 1988 campaign finance
disclosure statement, Mayor Koch's campaign committee has not
refunded any portion of a $5,000 contribution from the law firm
of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman which was made
on December 10, 1987, three months before the Board of Estimate
voted on March 10, 1988 to approve a $30,000 contract between the
law firm and the Teacher's Retirement System. See Calendar of the
Board of Estimate, March 10, 1988, no. 271. Nor, according to
his recent disclosure statements, has Council President Stein
refunded any portion of the $6,000 contributed by the law firm of
Brown & Wood in three $2,000 installments which each fell within
the 18-month window surrounding the Board of Estimate's approval
on January 22, 1987 of a $2.64 million contract for Brown & Wood
to serve as the City's bond counsel.
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3.

The Solicitation and Acceptance of Contributions
From Those Who Do Business With the City Should
Be Altogether Banned
The legality of the acceptance of campaign contribu-

tions from those who do business with the city was challenged in
a recent lawsuit brought against New Yorkers for Koch '85.

In

DiLucia v. Mandelker,54 the New York Court of Appeals rejected
the contention that Mayor Koch's receipt of contributions from
those interested directly or indirectly in business dealings with
New York City violated a ban on the acceptance of gifts contained
in the city Charter.55

The Court relied, in part, on an opinion

by the New York City Board of Ethics which concluded that a
campaign contribution does not constitute a "gift'' within the
meaning of the Charter.
54 68 N.Y. 2d 844, 508 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (1986), aff'g 110 A.D.
2d 260, 493 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1st Dept. 1985).
55 Section 2604 of the New York City Charter provides in
pertinent part:
b. No member of the board of estimate or the council or
other salaried officer or employee of the city or any
city agency: ..• (3) shall accept any valuable gift,
whether in the form of service, loan, thing or promise,
or in any other form, from any person, firm,
corporation or other entity which to his knowledge is
interested directly or indirectly in any manner
whatsoever in any such business dealings.

***
d. As used in this chapter, the words "business
dealings with the city" shall include any contract,
service, work or business with, any sale, renting or
other disposition to, any purchase, leasing, or other
acquisition from, and any grant, license, permit or
other privilege from, the city or any city agency, and
any performance of or litigation with respect to any of
the foregoing.
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The Court was not called upon to reach the underlying
ethical question and so did not address it.

There is, however,

language in that Board of Ethics opinion which the Commission
finds both prescient and persuasive on this crucial issue.

While

acceptance of campaign contributions from those interested in
business dealings may not currently be illegal, it is, as the
Board of Ethics rightly concluded, unethica1.56

The Commission

shares the Board of Ethics' view that the solicitation and
acceptance of contributions from those who do business with the
City offends proper ethical standards, and seconds the Board of
Ethics's call for the prompt enactment of legislation to prohibit
the solicitation and acceptance of such contributions. In the
Board's words:
The solicitation of funds for political
purposes by a public official from those
whose matters come before him or his agency
for official action is offensive to proper
ethical standards •.•
[T]he solicitation and acceptance of
political contributions by public officers
from persons, firms or corporations doing
business with government with which these
public officers and employees are connected
is against the public interest and should be
prohibited .••
It is our recommendation that appropriate
legislation be enacted on all levels of
government to deal effectively with conduct
that now is contrary to proper standards but

56 See Opinion No. 35, New York City Board of Ethics (Oct .
5, 1961).
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is not prohibited by law.57
The Commission believes that the "appropriate legislation" needed to address this situation is two-pronged:

a ban on

the solicitation of campaign contributions from those who have
business dealings with the City, and a ban on the making of
contributions by those who have business dealings with the City.

a.

A Ban On Soliciting Contributions

Under federal law, it is unlawful for any person
"knowingly to solicit" a campaign contribution from a government
contractor.SB

The Commission recommends that municipal officers

and employees in New York City, including elected officials, be
similarly prohibited from soliciting, directly or indirectly,
57 Id at pp.24-25. In its formal opinion no. 135, the Board
of Ethics reiterated its call for the enactment of legislation to
prohibit such contributions:
It is also our opinion that the acceptance of funds by
a public officer, even though unsolicited and not
prohibited by law, from persons who have an interest in
matters which come before him or his agency for
official action is also offensive to proper ethical
standards.
We repeat our previous recommendation that appropriate
legislation should be enacted to deal effectively with
conduct that is contrary to proper ethical standards
but not now prohibited by law.
New York City Board of Ethics Opinion No. 135 (June 6, 1969).
58 2 u.s.c. §441c(a) (2). Cf. Deering's California Codes Ann.
§84308(b) (prohibiting solicitation and acceptance of
contributions in excess of $250 from participants in various
agency proceedings).
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campaign contributions from any person who has, or within the
previous twelve months has had, any business dealings with the
City. 59

The Commission believes that such a ban should not only

prohibit the publi6 offi6ial from asking the person who has
business dealings with the City to make a contribution, it should
also prohibit the public official from enlisting that person as a
solicitor of contributions from others.

We view with particular alarm the practice of public
officials who solicit campaign contributions or pledges on a oneon-one basis from those who have business dealings with the City.
Such a situation is fraught with the danger that the potential
contributor will feel coerced into making the contribution
requested and will believe himself entitled to expect some
benefit in return.

Although the Department of Investigation has

publicly deplored the practice,60 it flourishes unabated.

Only

an explicit ban can put a stop to it.

59 The ban on solicitation should extend to all officers
and partners of the business entity or firm which has business
dealings with the City.
60 Anatomy of A Municipal Franchise: New York City Bus
Shelter Program, 1973-1979 - An Investigative Report, New York
City Department of Investigation (July 1981), Conclusions p. 13.
(Comptroller Harrison Goldin's "conduct of knowingly soliciting
campaign contributions from persons seeking to do business with
the City •.• gave rise to the appearance of impropriety and
favoritism").
-
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b.

A Ban On Making Or Accepting Contributions

Under federal law, it is unlawful for "any person who
enters into any contract with the United States or any department
or agency thereof either for the rendition of personal services
or furnishing any material, supplies or equipment .... or for
selling any land or building •.•. " to make political contributions.61

The ban begins at the time contract negotiations

commence and extends until performance under the contract is
complete. 62

The Commission urges the adoption of a similar ban for
those who do business with New York City.

To be effective, the

ban should extend not only, as in the federal law, to those who
seek to enter into contracts with city agencies for the sale of
goods or services or leasing of property, but also those who, in
the course of their business activities, apply for tax abatements, zoning variances and other discretionary benefits63 such
as the settlement of claims against the City prior to litiga-

61 2

u.s.c.

§441(a) (1).

62 Id. The ban also applies to those whose negotiations with
the government are unsuccessful and covers the period from
initiation of negotiations to their termination.
63 Cf., Deering's California Code Ann. §84308 (1985), which
restricts the contributions which can be made by "a party, or his
or her agent, to a proceeding involving a license, permit or
other entitlement for use pending before any agency."
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tion.64

The ban should begin, as the federal ban begins, with

the date bids are first sought or a request for proposals is
first issued by the relevant agency (in the case of contracts)
or, in the case of -an application for a discretionary benefit,
with the date the relevant administrative application is made.
The ban should extend until twelve months after performance is
complete under the contract or twelve months after the date the
application process is concluded and all necessary approvals
(including those of the Board of Estimate) have been received.

Under federal law, contributions by employees,
officers, family members or stockholders of the federal contractor organization are not restricted.65

Given the ease with which

large organizations such as law firms and investment banking
firms are able to "bundle" contributions from partners and
officers, the Commission believes that New York must go beyond
the rudimentary strictures of the federal law.

Instead, using

the categories set forth in the Goodman amendment, the ban
64 Under the City Charter and the New York Administrative
Code, the Comptroller has the sole discretion to settle claims
against the City, including major construction claims, before a
formal lawsuit is instituted. See New York City Charter §93(g);
N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§7-20l(a) and 7-202. Firms in the
construction industry contributed over $69,000 to the
comptroller's re-election bid in 1984 and 1985.
65 T.J. Schwarz and A.G. Straus, Federal Regulation of
campaign Finance and Political Activity, vol. 1, §2.04[3][i)[vii]
at 2-85; see also AO 1984-10, Fed. Elec. camp. Fin. Guide (CCH),
para. 5760 (April 17, 1984) (although neither a law firm
providing legal services to a federal agency nor its partners may
make contributions through a partnership account, partners may
make contributions in their own names from personal funds.)
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should extend to corporate officers and business partners of the
entity doing business with the City.

D. The Advantages of Incumbency Must Be Curtailed

Two aspects of the City Campaign Finance Act are of
concern to the Commission in so far as they promote the advantage
which incumbents enjoy over their challengers: the failure of
the Act to curtail off-year fundraising, and the Act's artificially low limits on expenditures for City Council primary
races.
1. Off Year Fundraising

Fundraising has become a constant preoccupation of
officeholders. A variety of witnesses have told the Commission
that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the
political fundraising process since the 1970's and that fundraising by incumbent officeholders now takes place throughout the
election cycle.

The success with which incumbent officeholders have
mined the opportunity for off-year fundraising which incumbency
affords is illustrated by the following figures.

In 1983 and

1984, the two years which preceded his re-election in 1985,
Mayor Koch raised $1,011,829 and $1,926,455 respectively.
Comptroller Harrison Goldin, also an incumbent, raised $253,583
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and $666,618 in those same two non-election years. 66

Nor has the Mayor's fundraising effort been on hold
since the 1985 election.

In 1986, the Mayor raised $755,469.

1987, he raised $737,152.

In

In those same years, Council President

Stein raised $154,350 and $174,650 respectively.67

Comptroller Goldin, with a warchest of approximately
$1.5 million, has not accepted contributions since March 1986.
He has, however, hosted a number of fundraising events in the
last two years, paid for from past campaign contributions.

In

July 1987, for instance, he hosted a party for 170 guests at the
Metropolitan.Museum of Art, which was paid for by one of his
campaign committees.68

The Comptroller described the Metropoli-

tan Museum party and other similar events in the following terms:
[I]t is the practice of many candidates to
hold fundraisers at least on an annual basis
to which they sell tickets. I tend not to do
that.
I tend to hold fundraising type
functions for contributors who have either
contributed in the past or contributors whom
I anticipate will contribute in the future
•... They all understand that it is related
to fundraising, although there is no direct
fundraising, necessarily, at the function.69

66 See Appendix A at pp. 2, 6.
67 Id. at pp. 2,4.
68 March 14 Tr. at pp. 114-15.
69 June Tr. at pp. 210.
- 33 -

According to Dr. Herbert Alexander, an election law
expert familiar with New York city's campaign financing practices, the capability of well-known and incumbent candidates to
raise money early and quickly

"giv[es) them an unfair edge over

their lesser-known opponents and perhaps forestall[s) others
from entering a race altogether. 11 70 Dr. Alexander has pointed out
that candidates for off ice in New York could be barred from
accepting contributions earlier than one year before the first
day to circulate designating petitions for the office which the
candidate is seeking, i.e., earlier than 15 months before the
primary election.71

The Commission urges the amendment of the City's
Campaign Finance Act to . bar candidates from accepting contributions more than fifteen months before the primary election.
Alternatively, the Commission recommends that the Act be amended
to provide that contributions received more than 15 months prior
to the election will not be taken into account in determining the
amount of public funds a candidate is entitled to receive under
the new public financing system.

70 Alexander, Herbert E., Options for Election Reform in
New York City - Report to the New York City Charter Revision
Commission, October 15, 1987, at 14.
71 Id. at 15.
-
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2. City Council Expenditure Limits

The Commission also views with concern the $60,000 cap
imposed by the Act on primary election expenditures in an
election year by candidates for City Council.7 2

A $60,000 cap is

far too low to allow meaningful competition in New York City's
all-important primary elections.

Such a low limit favors

incumbents and will almost certainly have the effect of discouraging City Council challenges.

This flies in the face of

the very purpose of public funding, which is to open the
political process to outsiders who lack both the financial
backing and superior name recognition enjoyed by incumbents.

In our December 1987 report, we recommended that
expenditure limits for statewide campaigns be set no lower than
75% .of the highest amounts expended for the office in the last
three elections.73

Applied to recent City Council races, that

formula suggests that the $60,000 expenditure limit is much too
low.

For example, in a 1985 race, David Rothenberg spent well

over $200,000 (three quarters of it in the election year) in a
strong but ultimately unsuccessful challenge to Councilwoman
Carol Greitzer.

A $60,000 election-year cap might well have

resulted in no contest at all.

72 N.Y.C. Admin. Code.§3-706(a).
73 See December Report, supra n.1, at pp.43-44.
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IV.

The Monitoring of Contributions By Those Who Do
Business With the City Is Critical

A.

The Board Of Estimate's Primitive Recordkeeping
Practices Have crippled The Monitoring Of
Contributions By Those Who Do Business With the City
The most serious obstacle to the effort to track in any

systematic way the discretionary benefits awarded to contributors
has been the primitive state of recordkeeping at the Board of
Estimate.
date.

The public records of the Board are shockingly out of

The Board's Journal of Proceedings which, by law, is

required to document the business of the Board, has not been
published since 1981.74

The index to the Journal of Proceedings,

without which the Journal is all but useless, has not been
published since 1976.75

There is, in effect, no public record of

decisions by the Board since the Goodman amendment was enacted.

Instead, the public must turn to the overworked staff
of the Bureau of the Secretary of the Board, whose manually
maintained working files are woefully unsuited to answering even
the most basic of questions.

The Board's records are organized

chronologically by Board of Estimate calendar date and calendar
number and not alphabetically by the name of the person or
business whose matter was voted on by the Board.

There is,

therefore, no ready way to determine how many times in the past
74 June Tr. at 169-70 & Exh. 36.
75 Id. at 170 & Exh. 37.
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three years a given developer/contributor has received a zoning
variance and which members of the Board voted for and against
those variances, or how frequently a contract for investment
advisory services has been awarded to a given investment banking
firm and which members of the Board voted to approve those
contracts.

Short of embarking upon the laborious and time

consuming chore of searching through filing cabinets of index
cards and calendar records, the Board's staff cannot answer such
fundamental questions.

When Commission investigators asked the Board to supply
information on who voted for and against certain recent calendar
items, they were referred to handwritten, hastily pencilled notes
in the margins of staff's copies of the Board calendar, which
only Board staff were capable of deciphering.

Commission

investigators were repeatedly told that there is no indexing
system which would allow them to track a matter's progress
through the Board's proceedings.

The Commission is appalled by the primitive state of
the Board's records.

The Board of Estimate is, after all, "the

City's most important administrative body and may be considered
the Board of Directors for the City of New York. 11 76

The

impenetrability of its records and the concomitant difficulty of

76 The Board of Estimate (undated) at 1 (on file at the
Commission).
-
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tracing the progress of a matter through the Board's decisionmaking process means that any relationship between campaign
contributions and the Board's decisions is, in most instances,
effectively hidden -from public view.

B.

Recent Efforts To Update the Board's
Recordkeeping Practices

Following the enactment of the Goodman amendment, the
Board of Estimate passed a resolution requiring all persons with
business before the Board to file a disclosure document (known as
Form 333) which is designed to identify those to whom the Goodman
law's restrictions apply -- persons with business before the
Board and their partners, corporate officers and five percent
shareholders.77

As of the Commission's hearing in June, the information
contained on Form 333, like the rest of the information at the
Board, was not organized in any fashion which permitted analysis.

77 Ironically, the Form 333 promulgated by the Board in 1986
contained no warning which would have put those with business
before the Board on notice of their obligation to refrain from
making contributions in excess of $3,000.
Indeed, in November
1987, when the Commission questioned Corporation Counsel staff
about the absence of such a warning, the Commission was told that
the City took the position that it did not make sense to single
out one provision of the Election Law for inclusion as a warning
on the form.
In May 1988, the Commission was advised that the
City was in the process of revising Form 333 and that the
revision would include a warning about the Goodman law's
contribution limits.
-
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These key disclosure documents were neither computerized nor even
alphabetized; it was therefore not possible to find out how
frequently a given contributor has appeared before the Board.

Back in November 1986, a computer program which would
have allowed the Board to computerize the Form 333 information
and to conduct searches of the Form 333 data base was written by
staff of the Kingsborough Community College.

Although the

computer program was completed by the spring of 1987 and was
demonstrated to the City at that time, the Board never implemented it.

Discussion of the need to computerize the Board's
records, however, resumed in May 1988.

On May 10, 1988 -- one

month after the Commission sent a letter to each of the eight
members of the Board of Estimate, asking them to detail what
measures, if any, were in place to ensure compliance with the
Goodman amendment -- representatives of the Board met to discuss
the revamping of Form 333.

The following week, on May 16, 1988,

the Secretary of the Board of Estimate ("the Secretary")
circulated to Board members a proposal to computerize not only
the Form 333 information but also the entire operation of the
Board -- its calendars, resolutions and Journals of Proceedings - at a cost of $2 million.78 In early June, the Secretary scaled
his proposal down to $900,000.79

78 See June Tr. at 170, Exhibit 41.
79 Id. at 172-75, Exhibit 42.
-
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The Secretary's June 9, 1988 budget proposal was
striking in several respects.

First, the Board acknowledged the

primitive state of -its own records:
The Bureau of the Secretary has the mandate
to maintain the official public records of
the Board of Estimate, in matters involving
the expenditure of funds over $10,000. The
current system of maintaining these records
is archaic and increasingly in danger of
collapse due to a growing backlog .••.
At present, there is no form of automation
available for tracking, filing and preparation of the calendar, calendar digest,
journal, resolutions, correspondence, 333
information. All procedures are performed
manually. These manual systems have been in
place for as long as 30 years or more, and
depend heavily on the experience and accuracy
of key personnel. Even for these personnel,
the procedures are time consuming and
cumbersome ..•.•
[A]ll tracking of submission documents is
manually recorded on index cards. These
cards must be manually searched for tracking
information. It is time-consuming both to
create and maintain these tracking documents
and to retrieve information from them.
Backlo~s make the process even more ineff icient. O
Second, the June 9, 1988 proposal notes that the cost
of the new equipment required to computerize the Board's
operations would, in less than two years, be fully offset by
savings in the cost the Board presently incurs by contracting out
the printing of the Board's calendar to a commercial printer.

80 Id. at 173-75, Exhibit 42 at 1, 2.
-
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At the Commission's hearing on June 20, 1988, each of
the three Citywide officeholders pledged their support for the
modernization of the Board of Estimate records.Bl

The Commis-

sion was consequently disappointed to learn that the fiscal year
1989 budget approved by the City Council and the Board of
Estimate the following week contained no new appropriation for
the Board's computerization efforts.

Following the failure of the City Council and the Board
of Estimate to include funds for the computerization effort in
the budget adopted on June 30, 1988, the Commission wrote to each
of the three Citywide officials to urge them to make such funds
available immediately.

In response, the Mayor assured the

Commission that he stands by his commitment "to do whatever is
necessary to modernize the operations of the Secretary's office"
and that any necessary budget modifications will be submitted to
the Board of Estimate and city Counci1.82

The Commission has since been advised that the Board
has begun to enter information from the Form 333 disclosure
document into a small personal computer data base and that the
Secretary plans to release a request for proposals for a turnkey
computer system, the first phase of which would allow the
81 June Tr. at

so,

126, 176-77.

82 Letter from Mayor Edward I. Koch to Commission Chairman
John D. Feerick, dated July 29, 1988 (copy on file at the
Commission).
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tracking of information from Form 333.

The Commission intends to

continue to monitor the Board's implementation of these computerization plans.

V. Conclusion
Commendably, New York City has taken the first step in
the direction of ridding election campaigns of the influence of
large campaign contributions.

Yet loopholes relating to loans

and corporate contributions, and the continued tolerance of the
iniquitous practice of soliciting and accepting contributions
from those whose businesses stand to benefit from favorable City
action undercut the promise of reform held out to New York
voters.

This is no time for half-measures.

Genuine campaign

finance reform at both the state and City levels must banish
forever the specter of the influence of private business
interests over the public trust.
Dated:

New York, New York
September 28, 1988

STATE OF NEW YORK
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT
INTEGRITY
John D. Feerick,
Chairman
Richard D. Emery
Patricia M. Hynes
James L. Magavern
Bernard s. Meyer
Bishop Emerson J. Moore
Cyrus R. Vance

-
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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORMS OF NYC CANDIDATES
CANDIDATE: Edward I. Koch
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/11/88
Dollar
Amount

Dollar
Amount

No.
Count

Expenses

Monetary Contributions

$7,830,499.14

20,679

Transfers Out

$

- 0 -

0

Non-cash Contributions

$

79,438.97

47

Loan Repayments

$

2,500.00

1

Loans Received

$

2,500.00

1

Carpaign Expenditures

$ 6,570,680.51

15

Transfers In

$

36,805.21

9

Contribution Refunds

$

33

$

18,097.48

14

$ 174,798.97

113

ss, 142, 139.n

20,863

Jname

Refunds of

C~ign

Exp.

Other Receipts
Final Totals:

Harrison

CANDIDATE:

91, 154.58

No.
Couit

J. Goldin

Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/15/88
Dollar
Amount

No .
Coll'lt

Expenses

Dollar
Amount

Monetary Contributions

$2,050,221.45

1, 153

Transfers out

$ 553,203.00

Non-cash Contributions

$

500.00

1

Loan Repayments

$

1,000.00

1

Loans Received

$

- 0 -

0

Carpaign Expenditures

$1,672,591.93

34

Transfers In

$ 561,000.00

15

Contribution Refunds

s

14

Inc~

Refunds of

C~ign

Exp.

Other Receipts
Final Totals:

s

2,516.93

6

s

501,856.59

74

$3,116,094.97

1,249

CANDIDATE:

60,500.00

No.
Count
17

Andrew J. Stein

Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88
Dollar
Amount

No.
COll'lt

Expenses

Monetary Contributions

$2,426,467.50

1,021

Transfers

Non-cash Contributions

s

800.00

4

Loans Received

$1,254,875.00

Transfers In

s

I~

Refunds of

C~ign

Exp.

Other Receipts
Final Totals:

Dollar
Amount

No.
Coll'lt

Loan Repayments

s
s

930, 713.18

45

39

Ca"l'<lign Expenditures

$3, 151, 109.98

15

85,000.00

14

Contribution Refl.nds

$

22,000 . 00

6

$

4,908.42

10

$

2,828.29

11

S3,n4,879.21

1,099

A-1

~t

159,486.28

254

CANDIDATE:

Edward I. Koch

Filing Period

Year

Total Monetary Contributions

1/15/83 - 7/11/88

No.
COll'lt

Year

Total Monetary Contributions
lnder $100

No.
Count

1983

$1 ,011,829 .oo

469

1983

s

274.00

8

1984

$1,926,454.92

6,006

1984

s 73,717.00

4,961

1985

$3,268,580.06

12, 194

1985

s

201,901.99

7,607

1986

s

755,469.18

468

1986

s

517.00

22

1987

s

737, 151.98

1,448

1987

s 20,802.00

875

1988

s

131,014.00

94

1988

s

No .
Co1..nt

Year

Year

Total Monetary Contributions
$100 - $499

414.00

Total Monetary Contributions
$500 - $999

15

No.
Count

1983

s

18,050.00

79

1983

s 35,000.00

68

1984

s

68,927.92

441

1984

s 39,934.00

74

1985

s

481,308.00

3,201

1985

s 208,628.00

403

1986

s

12,200 . 18

74

1986

s 13, 750. 00

27

1987

s

25,850.00

165

1987

s

23,499.98

46

1988

s

1,350.00

8

1988

s

2,250 . 00

4

No.
Co1..nt

Year

Year

Total Monetary Contributions
$1,000 - S4,999

Total Monetary Contributions
S5,000 and over

No.
Count

1983

s 376,005.00

233

1983

s

582,500.00

81

1984

s

567,826.00

376

1984

$1,176,050.00

154

1985

$1,085,802.00

806

1985

$1 ,290,941.00

177

1986

s

509,002.00

304

1986

s

220,000.00

41

1987

s

662,000.00

361

1987

s

5,000.00

1

1988

s

127,000.00

1988

s

- 0 -

0

67
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CANDIDATE:

Edward I. Koch

INCOME
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/11/88

Transfers In

Refunds
of C~ign
Expenditures

Loans Received

- 0 -

$ 5,000.00

$

- 0 -

$

- 0 -

93,404.96

$ 10,000.00

$ 17,474.29

$ 15,951.52

$

- 0 -

$

32,613.86

$ 68,434.22

s

- 0 -

s

1,055.86

s

- 0 .

s 755,469.18

s

6,712.58

s 1,004. 7S

s

- 0 -

s

1,027.67

s

- 0 -

1987

s 737, 151.98

s

854.06

s

- 0 -

s 11, 198.82

s

62.44

$

2,500.00

1988

s 131,014.00

s

18, 151.33

s

- 0 -

s 3, 132.00

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

Year

Monetary
Contributions

1983

Other Receipts

Non Cash
Contributions

$1,011,829.00

$

23,062.18

$

1984

$1,926,455.92

$

1985

$3,268,580.06

1986

EXPENSES
Filing Period

1/15/83 - 7/11/88

Year

Transfers out

Loan
Repayments

Carrpaign
Expenditures

Contributions
Refunded

1983

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

142, 115.00

$

1,000.00

1984

s

- 0 .

s

- 0 -

s 607,904.00

s

19,000.00

1985

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

$4,703,602.00

$

21,no.oo

1986

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s 845,997.00

s

23,384.58

1987

s

- 0 -

s

2,500.00

s 153,889.00

s

3,000.00

1988

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s 117, 174.50

s

17,000.00
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Andrew J. Stein

CANDIDATE:

Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88

No.

Year

Total Monetary Contributions

Coi..nt

Year

Total Monetary Contributions
i..nder $100

No.

Count

1983

$

- 0 -

0

1983

$

- 0 -

0

1984

$

- 0 -

0

1984

$

- 0 -

0

1985

$2,050,065.00

788

1985

$

265.00

7

1986

$ 154,350.00

88

1986

$

- 0 -

0

1987

$ 174,650.00

111

1987

$

- 0 -

0

1988

s

34

1988

s

354.50

4

Coi..nt

Year

Year

47,402.50

Total Monetary Contributions
$100 - $499

No.

Total Monetary Contributions
$500 - $999

No.

Count

1983

s

- 0 -

0

1983

$

- 0 -

0

1984

s

- 0 -

0

1984

$

- 0 -

0

1985

$

22,150.00

107

1985

$

75,000.00

149

1986

$

3,350.00

14

1986

$

6,000.00

12

1987

$

2,450.00

12

1987

$

4,200~00

8

1988

s

2,401.00

9

1988

s

2,667.00

5

Coi..nt

Year

Year

Total Monetary Contributions
$1,000 - $4,999

No.

Total Monetary Contributions
S5,000 and over

No.

Count

1983

$

- 0 -

0

1983

s

- 0 -

0

1984

s

- 0 -

0

1984

s

- 0 -

0

1985

s

560,150.00

322

1985

S1,392,500.00

203

1986

$

72,500.00

48

1986

s

72,500.00

14

1987

$ 128,000.00

83

1987

s

40,000.00

8

1988

s

13

1988

s

20,000.00

3

22,000.00
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Andrew J. Stein

CANDIDATE:

INCOME
Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88

Transfers In

Refunds
of C~ign
Expenditures

Loans Received

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

952.63

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

5,000.00

s

1,879.68

s

206,875.00

174,650.00

s

1, 141.32

s

800.00

s

20,000.00

s

2,076.11

s

- 0 -

47,402.50

s

1,686.97

s

- 0 -

s

60,000.00

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

Year

Monetary
Contributions

1983

s

1984

s

Other Receipts

Non Cash
Contributions

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

1985

S2,050,065.00

s

1986

s

154,350.00

1987

s

1988

s

EXPENSES
Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88

Year

Transfers Out

Loan
Repayments

Carrpaign
Expenditures

Contributions
Refunded

1983

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

1984

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

1985

s

48,336.66

s

476,075.34

S2,898,688.00

s

- 0 -

1986

s

14,769.50

s

432,609.50

s

95,915.00

s

22,000.00

1987

s

30,047.12

s

5,369.27

s

102,043.00

s

- 0 -

1988

s

66,333.00

s

16,659.32

s

55, 183.89

s

- 0 -

A-5

S1,048,000.00

CANDIDATE:

Harrison J. Goldin

Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/15/88

Year

Total Monetary Contributions

No.
CoU1t

Year

Total Monetary Contributions
Lllder $100

No.
Count

1983

$ 253,583.00

56

1983

$

- 0 -

0

1984

$ 666,616.57

280

1984

$

1, 149.90

18

1985

$1,092,521.88

799

1985

$

5,027.02

119

1986

s

32,500.00

17

1986

s

25.00

1

1987

s

5,000.00

1

1987

$

- 0 -

0

1988

s

- 0 -

0

1988

$

- 0 -

0

No.
COU1t

Year

Year

'

Total Monetary Contributions
$100 - $499

Total Monetary Contributions
$500 - $999

No.
Count

1983

s

250.00

1

1983

$

2,000.00

4

1984

s

8,000.00

39

1984

$

14,500.00

29

1985

s

65,269.90

311

1985

$

49,400.00

98

1986

s

2,975.00

8

1986

$

- 0 -

0

1987

$

- 0 -

0

1987

$

- 0 -

0

1988

$

- 0 -

0

1988

$

- 0 -

0

No.
Coll1t

Year

.
Year

Total Monetary Contributions
$1,000 - S4,999

Total Monetary Contributions
$5,000 and over

No.
Count

1983

$

46,000.00

24

1983

s

205,333.00

27

1984

s

260,300.00

136

1984

$ 382,666.67

58

1985

s

269,824.99

175

1985

s

702,999.97

96

1986

s

9,500.00

5

1986

$

20,000.00

3

1987

s

- 0 -

0

1987

$

5,000.00

1

1988

s

- 0 -

0

1988

$

- 0 -

0

A-6

Harrison J. Goldin

CANDIDATE:

INCOME
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/15/88

Year

Monetary
Contributions

1983

Transfers In

Refurds
of C~ign
Expenditures

Loans Received

- 0 -

s

500.00

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s 70,500.00

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s 120,591.04

s

500.00

$165,000.00

s

1,090.98

s

- 0 -

s

92, 126.44

s

- 0 -

S150,000.00

s

1,425.95

s

- 0 -

s 222,959.46

s

- 0 -

s 50,000.00

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

s

s

- 0 -

S125,000.00

s

- 0 -

s

- 0 -

Other Receipts

Non cash
Contributions

s 253,583.00

s

- 0 -

s

1984

s 666,617.57

s

- o-

1985

S1, 092, 521.88

1986

s

32,500.00

1987

s

5,000.00

1988

s

- 0 -

66, 179.65

EXPENSES
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/15/88

Transfers out

Loan
Repayments

Can-paign

Year

Expenditures

Contributions
Refurded

1983

s

12,598.00

s

1,000.00

s

50,242.46

s

- 0 -

1984

s

64,605.00

s

- 0 -

s

79,749.74

s

28,500.00

1985

s 150,000.00

s

- 0 -

s 967,836.71

s

12,000.00

1986

s 151,000.00

s

- 0 •

s 183,544.19

s

20,000.00

1987

s

50,000.00

s

• 0 •

s 210,458.29

s

- 0 -

1988

s 125,000.00

s

- 0 -

s

s

- 0 -

A-7

92,385.00

APPENDIX B

WITNESSES APPEARING AT COMMISSION HEARINGS
ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE PRACTICES
March 14, 1988

Gerald M. Leyy, Chief investigator, New York State
Commission on Government Integrity
Lawrence Mandelker, Campaign treasurer for New York
City, Mayor Edward I. Koch
John Gold, Campaign treasurer for New York City
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin.
Laura Schwed, Personal assistant to John Gold
Diana Hoffman, Appointment secretary for New York City
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin
Joseph Bernstein, President, New York Land Company
Philip Friedman, Campaign manager for New York City
Council President Andrew J. stein
William Zeckendorf, Chief executive officer, Zeckendorf
Company, Inc.
Gerald Guterman, President, Hanover Companies Inc.
Donald Trump, President, The Trump Organization
Richard Halperin, Senior Vice-President, Special
Counsel to the Chairman, McAndrews & Forbes
Group, Inc.

B-1

March 15, 1988

Richard Daddario, Senior assistant counsel, New York
State Commission of Investigation
Richard Tenenini, Former associate accountant, New York
State Board of Elections
Thomas Wallace, Executive director, New . York State
Board of Elections.
William Stern, Campaign chairman for New York
Governor Mario Cuomo (1982)
Ethan Geto, Campaign director and treasurer for New
York Attorney General Robert Abrams 1986 campaign.
Richard Gordon, Campaign director for New York
· Governor Mario Cuomo (1986)
Robert Taylor, Campaign treasurer for New York
Governor Mario Cuomo
Lawrence Buttenwieser, Finance Chairman for New York
State Attorney General Robert Abrams
Robert Pressman, Executive Vice President, Barney's New
York
Donald Zucker, Donald Zucker Co.
Bruce Eichner, President, Eichner Properties
Lawrence Huntington, Campaign chairman for New York
State Comptroller Edward V. Regan
John Marino, Executive director of the New York State
Democratic Committee; former chief executive
officer of the Friends of Mario Cuomo; fundraiser
for New York State Lieutenant Governor Stan
Lundine
David Schulz, Campaign treasurer for New York
Lieutenant Governor Stan Lundine

B-2

June 20, 1988

The Honorable Edward I. Koch, Mayor of the City of New
York
The Honorable Andrew J. Stein, New York City council
President
The Honorable Harrison J. Goldin, New York City
Comptroller
Howard J. Rubenstein, President, Howard J. Rubenstein
Associates, Inc.
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